Background Concepts
Engagement with the World
I read Kierkegaard as responding to a Hegelian religious tradition that claimed we could understand both the natural and supernatural world with the use of reason. Kierkegaard is, in part, providing a counterexample in the form of a paradox he believes is found in a careful reading of the Binding of Isaac.
In the preface, Kierkegaard sets the discussion up in a useful way. He outlines three types of engagement with the world:
Aesthetic Ethical Religious
He claims philistines are under the first, Knights of Infinite Resignation under the second, and those of Faith under the third. There is a preference ranking with the last being considered best. If we think of Kierkegaard as examining ways in which one can have faith, we can make sense of his discussion of previous philosophers like Descartes and the Skeptics, who were known to be distinct with respect to ways of doubting. Consider the following:
Aesthetic Ethical Religious
Simple Doubt Sophisticated Doubt Ancient Skeptics
Simple Faith Sophisticated Faith Knight of Faith
Simple faith is unreflective, sensory, and, well, philistine. Similar remarks apply to methods of doubt. One might simply doubt to doubt, unreflectively, saying things like “It’s all your opinion” or “Everything’s relative” without much thought. Simple doubters parrot such statements much like those with simple faith parrot sermon or scripture.
More sophisticated are those with ethical faith or doubt. This might be more appropriately called principled faith or doubt, since the important feature is that either emerges from principles. Doubting in a principled manner was what Descartes was doing, one sensory experience at a time, for the purposes of building a grand theory. Similarly, sophisticated faith of this sort seems what the Hegelians were doing, uncovering principles of the natural and supernatural world through reason alone. Importantly, this is a reflective process, requiring great work, and much patience and skill. It is admirable.
Still, sophisticated doubt and faith fall short of religious. Here we have what Kierkegaard will elaborate as the Knight of Faith, who leaps the bounds of logic to accept while resigning the natural world. We find a parallel in ancient skepticism, a school that believed the point of inquiry into truth was to continue searching for it, not to find it. For any argument concluding P they’d give just as good an argument for not P. The point was to generate instability of belief, since that was how one maintained the journey towards truth. The parallel here with the Knight of Faith seems to be that they’re never confident of any, say, acquisition of some principle of the natural or supernatural world. Rather, they’re open towards being wrong even when they believe they’re right. The Knight of Faith is more concerned with the journey rather than the destination.
Sources of Knowledge
The Knight of Faith also differs from that of the Knight of Infinite Resignation with respect to the sort of knowledge they have. Kierkegaard says the latter’s knowledge of God is mediated, while the former has direct access to God. I think of this as a difference between:
Knowledge by Description
Knowing by Acquaintance
The Knight of Infinite Resignation has mediated access to God through, say, ethical principles like the ten commandments, which is like reading everything there is to read about God as a description. But that falls short of experiencing God directly in an unmediated manner. The Knight of Faith leaps into faith through the absurd, and in that act gains knowledge about God directly, by being acquainted with God.*
*Note: I think an equally good case can be made for thinking Kierkegaard is playing on the distinction between:
Knowing how
Knowing that
I can read every manual on how to play tennis, and so know that I should do this or that in a match, but I won’t know how to play tennis until I actually start playing. Kierkegaard is plausibly understood as claiming the Knight of Infinite Resignation has knowledge that God commands this or that, through ethical principles like the ten commandments, but that the Knight of Faith has knowledge of how God commands this or that, through faith in the absurd. To complicate matters further, it seems plausible given the nature of the absurd and resistance to rational comprehension, the Knight of Faith has knowledge by acquaintance of instances of how God commands through the absurd, but lacks any general descriptive knowledge about how God commands since the nature of the absurd is such that general rules cannot be constructed from instances.
Philosophical Toolkit
Motivation
Before turning to the story of Abraham, it’s worth briefly discussing a strategy I’ve found useful for understanding direct experiences that I myself have not, and perhaps cannot have. This is relevant here because it’s unlikely any of us have ever experienced what Abraham experienced in this story, and that may make us feel like we can’t really understand what he’s going through. Abraham exhibits faith in the absurd, and it’s plausibly we can’t understand the absurd; that’s the point.
That said, just because we'll never understand, say, a circular square, we can nevertheless understand something being square and something separately being circular. Similarly, we can divide and conquer this story. Specifically, we can make progress by, say, thinking about aspects of the story on analogy with things we have experienced.
I teach a course called the Philosophy of Race and Racism. Clearly, there's a white elephant in the room (me!). I address this immediately when the semester begins, and return to it throughout so we don’t lose sight of it, since it’s certainly relevant to our discussions that a white man is leading them; my views are informed by privilege that I can’t entirely escape. That said, I have something to add to the discussion worth taking seriously that’s not simply that I’ve read lots of relevant literature. I grew up rather poor in a trailer park, have been to jail, was afraid of the police, don’t know my father, was physically and emotionally abused, dropped out of high school, didn’t start college until 22, etc. Simply put, I experienced a lot of traumatic events. They unfortunately and sometimes surprisingly overlap with traumatic experiences many individuals marginalized due to race have. I can speak from direct experience about such events, and in that manner illustrate the intersection of class and race discrimination, from the position of privilege. This is not to compare apples to oranges. I can't speak about what it's like to be a Black woman in America, and I'm not going to act like I can. I can – to some extent - speak about where our harmful experiences intersect with class.
Kierkegaard spends much time outlining how you might go wrong in understanding Abraham. That’s useful, by it’s a description of the scenario by telling you what it’s not. We’re going to try to understand the scenario by saying what it is. I think comprehension is much deeper if you have both. I call doing both in the manner just described Explication.
Explication Strategy
Let’s think about aspects of the Binding of Isaac story:
(1) Love: I've loved; you have too presumably. I’m assuming Abraham loved Isaac. Consider how strongly you feel towards someone you love, how encompassing that can be, how much you’d be willing to sacrifice for them, and how much you’d be willing to do that happily.
(2) Sacrifice: This is loss, but for some greater purpose. Abraham is plausibly understood as not simply losing Isaac, but sacrificing him for a great purpose. Think about the greatest sacrifice you’ve made in your life. While not the greatest, I once sacrificed a $200K career for love. It’s easy to see how (1) and (2) interplay in this example. I did so happily; I’d do it again.
(3) Power: The relevant thing here seems to be overwhelming authority and unwavering power. God can’t be resisted; God is all-powerful. From a positive perspective, this is something inspiring and worth appreciating. I once visited Niagara Falls and felt the sheer awesomeness of the waves crashing over the rocks. I felt small, I felt powerless, but I felt appreciative. I didn’t feel in danger, but I didn’t feel like I wasn’t in danger either.
(4) Consent: If I asked you whether you wanted to end class early, but before you answered said I’d chop off your arm if you didn’t stay in class, I don’t think it’d count as consent if you said “No.” You can’t consent – I think – under overwhelming threat of violence. Abraham appears to be consenting to sacrificing Isaac. I’m not sure; this seems a place where consent breaks down. God cannot be resisted. The intersection of (3) and (4) seem clear. Niagara Falls wasn’t trying to kill me, or asking some great sacrifice. This isn’t always the case in our experiences.
(5) Ethical Tension: Here is where we find, I think, the most obvious paradox. In class, this was presented as tension between Abraham being asked to murder Isaac and ethical law prescribing one not murder. I don’t think that’s quite right. “Murder” is typically understood as ‘unjustified killing’ but Abraham is plausibly understood as being asked to justifiably kill Isaac. It’s a sacrifice, and those have a purpose. I think the ethical tension here is more precisely between Abraham being asked to sacrifice his son, which is a violation of parental obligation we all seem to have.
(6) Faith: Faith not only comes up in religious contexts; faith arises in science as well. There is some measure of faith in assuming one set of axioms explains the world while another doesn’t. Data always underdetermines theory; ultimately we have to make a choice about which theory to choose. Choosing primitives is in part a matter of faith. On the other hand, choices about what you think needs explaining by your theory is also a matter of faith. A very thoughtful Christian friend of mine believes the way he understands the world needs something like God. He has data to explain I don’t recognize, so I don’t feel the pull of this need. He’s primitive data to explain, and that strikes me – as primitive assumptions tend to – as having faith.
Each of these aspects of the story seem things we can understand given we’ve had direct experience with them in various ways. The trouble for us in the Binding of Isaac is putting them all together. Now that we have a handle on these aspects, we’ll be able to see more clearly how Kierkegaard thinks the paradox of faith emerges in the Binding of Isaac.
Binding of Isaac
Which Paradox?
What exactly is the paradox? Let’s explore. Consider the following first pass:
(1) Abraham seeks to murder Isaac
(2) Murder is unjustified killing
(3) Hence, Abraham seeks to unjustifiably kill Isaac
(4) Abraham is a just individual
(5) Just individuals do not seek to do unjust actions
(6) Hence, Abraham does not seek to do an unjust action
Lines (3) and (6) are in conflict, i.e. they generate a paradox. This is a straightforward reading of the text. I don’t think it’s adequate, however, because I don’t think premise (1) is true. I think it’s more plausible that Abraham is asked to sacrifice Isaac. Sacrificing Isaac is not the same as murdering Isaac, since sacrifice might be justified. Murder is – by definition – unjustified. This provides Abraham some flexibility. Replacing “sacrifice” for “murder” and adjusting premises accordingly, we have:
(1) Abraham seeks to sacrifice Isaac
(2) Abraham is a just individual
(3) Just individuals do not seek to do unjust actions
(4) Hence, Abraham seeking to sacrifice Isaac is not an unjust action
Note, I’ve removed the premise mentioning “murder” since it was irrelevant; I’ve also removed the entailment claiming Abraham seeks to unjustifiably kill Isaac, since that no longer follows given the use of “sacrifice” instead of “murder”. Of course, with these adjustments, there is no obvious paradox. For that, we also need it to be the case that Abraham seeking to sacrifice Isaac is unjust. So far, this doesn’t follow from the premises. But we can strengthen them as follows:
(1) Isaac is Abraham’s son
(2) Abraham seeks to sacrifice Isaac
(3) If S is the parent of S’, and S seeks to sacrifice S’, then S seeking to sacrifice S’ is unjust action
(4) Hence, Abraham seeking to sacrifice Isaac is an unjust action
(5) Abraham is a just individual
(6) If S is a just individual then S does not seek to do unjust actions
(7) Hence, Abraham does not seek to do unjust actions
Here we have a conflict between (4) and (7), and so the paradox emerges from Abraham’s parental obligation – which is underwritten by ethical principles – and Abraham following God’s command to sacrifice.
That said, I still don’t think this is quite right. Consider, if the preceding is all we have to say about Abraham, then it’s not clear how to distinguish him from, say, Agamemnon who sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia. The preceding argument applies just as much to the latter case as to the former. So we must do more work to distinguish Abraham from Agamemnon.
Fortunately, our explication of aspects of the Binding of Isaac can help us. Above we observed the conflict between ethics and God’s command in this tale. But we also observed the presence of what appears to be another paradoxical element, namely, that between God’s power and Abraham’s ability to consent. That is not mentioned in our argument so far, and may be what we need to distinguish Abraham from Isaac. To contrast, Agamemnon might’ve been dishonored, or shamed by his soldiers and culture, had he not sacrificed his daughter; Abraham on the other hand was being commanded by an all-powerful God. I suspect the consequences for dissenting were far more substantial in the latter case, even those they’re substantial in both. Let’s turn this into an argument:
(1) Abraham consents to sacrifice his son Isaac
(2) Abraham is a just individual
(3) Just individuals do not consent to do unjust actions
(4) If S is the parent of S’, and S seeks to sacrifice S’, then S seeking to sacrifice S’ is unjust action
(5) Hence, Abraham consenting to sacrifice Isaac is an unjust action
(6) If S is a just individual then S does not seek to do unjust actions
(7) Hence, Abraham does not seek to do unjust actions
(8) If G commands S to do an action and G is all-powerful, then S cannot consent to do that action
(9) Hence, Abraham cannot consent to sacrificing his son Isaac
There are, then, two contradictions lurking here: (i) Abraham consenting to perform an action he cannot consent to; (ii) Abraham being just and yet violating ethical principles by sacrificing his son Isaac. The story of Agamemnon at best has only (ii). That’s sufficient to distinguish them.
It seems to me, moreover, that Agamemnon’s action is calculating in a way that Abraham’s is not. Agamemnon spends much time thinking of the right thing to do; Abraham hears the call of faith, says little, saddles up, and rides to do what he must. It’s claimed by some philosophers that character is that set of habits that underwrite action without need for deliberation. Abraham appears to be acting out of a faithful character; Agamemnon not so much.
Euthyphro Dilemma
I take Kierkegaard to be attacking the following claim:
(M) If God commands x then x is morally permissible
This should seem like an intuitively plausible claim. Consider, if (1) is true, then you can be sure that whatever God commands you to do will be morally permissible. There may, of course, be other things that are morally permissible. That is, there may be morally permissible actions that God hasn't commanded you to do. Whatever the case, the important point is that you have a firm link between what God commands and what is morally permissible. That gives you some surety as to what God thinks is morally okay. Moreover, this is precisely the sort of principle those who think you can simply rationalize your way to knowledge of the supernatural would adopt, i.e. Christian Hegelians.
But the Binding of Isaac is a counterexample to (M).
(1) SUPPOSE: If God commands x then x is morally permissible
(2) God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac
(3) Hence, Abraham sacrificing his son Isaac is morally permissible
(4) Abraham sacrificing his son Isaac is not morally permissible
(5) Hence, it's not the case that if God commands x then x is morally permissible
We supposed (1) for the sake of finding a contradiction. (2) is true of the scenario, and (3) follows by logic from (1) and (2). (4) is motivated by considering Abraham’s parental obligation to Isaac. But then (3) and (4) are in conflict. If you assume something and that leads to contradiction, you are allowed to assert the negation of what you supposed. Hence, (5) follows since it is the negation of (1). That is to say that (M) is false. I take this to be Kierkegaard’s general argument against (M).
You might have worries about this conclusion though. You can’t rationalize yourself to faith, but that also means God’s commands are something of a mystery, even though they trump ethical principles. We motivated (M) by observing how it links whatever God commands to morality, so you can be sure they don't come apart. But if (M) is false, then you can't be sure. You lose your connection to what God views as morally permissible. But what God thinks is morally permissible may differ widely from what we take ethics to command.
Response: God in the Old Testament gave us the commandments. We know what the right thing to do is.
Rejoinder: Do we? Abraham might disagree. You might say God has it in mind that we abide by the commandments for the most part, and only deviate when he asks. But that just pushes the question back. We seem to lose track of whether what we think is moral is ok or not. Admittedly, perhaps (M) wasn't so good a rule anyway. According to (M), a plausible reading of the Old Testament has it that homosexuality is morally wrong. But that seems mistaken. That might suggest (M) is false independently. In any event, the point becomes even stronger if (M) is false. If we lose (M), we leave open that what God commands isn't necessarily morally permissible, but we also lose knowledge about what is morally good, i.e. whether the commandments are – in fact – morally right. If (M) is false, what's right is what God says at a time. You might think this is OK if you think God is constant, but the Binding of Isaac suggest God isn’t so constant in command.
Let’s put this point more sharply using a variation of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Modernized a bit, the dilemma is this:
Is A good because God commands it or does God command A because it's good?
This is called a dilemma for a reason. Neither option seems okay. Let’s take them in turn:
Suppose A is good because God commands A. Then (M) is false. But we lose our grip on what good means. We're at God's mercy. Perhaps this is to be expected given the reliance on faith, God's power, and our inability to consent. We see some of the issues that might arise on this view. But honestly, the alternative isn't much better. To see why…
Suppose God commands A because A is good. Then what is good precedes what God commands. But then there is a standard for goodness independent of what God commands. But then we should be seeking this standard rather than God.
Response: Perhaps our only access to the standard is through God.
Rejoinder: If that's so, then we're back on the other horn. For we have no access to what's good other than what God allows us to see. But the Binding of Isaac makes trouble for this reading. If there's an independent standard of what's right, it seems plausible that in at least one of these cases God has asked Abraham to do something that is not in accordance with the standard. But then if God is our only access to the standard, we seem in a bad position, since God seems unreliable.
Ultimately, it seems like if we must choose we should choose the side Kierkegaard lands on. (M) is false, but we lose our grip on the relationship between what's ethical and God's will.
Expanding the Euthyphro Dilemma
The troubling position we find ourselves in might make you seek to reject the conclusion of Kierkegaard's argument. To do that - since it's valid - we reject one or more premises. Which would you reject?
It's not obvious which premise to reject. It looks like a good argument. But perhaps the argument is not as straightforward as outlined above. To see why, consider again the Euthyphro Dilemma and think more carefully about which horn Kierkegaard would accept…
If x is good then God commands x. I don't think Kierkegaard accepts this. This would be to put constraints on God. For if God commands x because x is good, then there is an external standard of God outside of God. But then we should be appealing to that standard, rather than God. That standard is - ethically speaking - prior. This doesn't fit with Kierkegaard's notion of God, I think, as unrestricted.
If God commands x then x is good. This is something like a divine command view. What good amounts to is just what God says. Then it's trivial that God commands the ethical, since that's the connection. But note, this is essentially (M). If God commands Abraham to murder Isaac, then Abraham murdering Isaac is good. But Kierkegaard clearly thinks it's not good that Abraham murder Isaac. Suppose otherwise. Then Abraham should simply do God's will because it's the right thing to do. He might even be able to explain this to others, e.g. God said to do it, and you know when God says to do something it's right, end of story. Then there’s no paradox. But since Kierkegaard thinks there is a paradox, he must think what God commands Abraham to do is not good. Since this horn entails (M) and Kierkegaard rejects (M), Kierkegaard rejects this horn too.
But now we’re in an even worse spot than before, for we don’t seem to be able to fit Kierkegaard in the dilemma at all! We seem to have a false dichotomy. We've posed and either/or situation and assumed Kierkegaard must be on one side. This need not be so. And I think the reason Kierkegaard isn't susceptible to the dilemma helps illustrate why the above argument might not be as detailed as it should be.
Kierkegaard seems to be operating with at least two notions of "good". There's the notion of good at the level of ethics, and the notion of good at the level of God. Hegelians and Christians at the time seemed to have a unified notion of good. They'd fall into the dilemma, so they'd be urged to pick a side. Kierkegaard has a bifurcated notion of good. There's ethical good, and there's religious good. They might be in tension, but the latter trumps the former when they conflict. This is why Kierkegaard doesn't fall into the dilemma. The dilemma employs a unified notion of good.
Can you think of a way to expand the dilemma to make it apply to Kierkegaard, perhaps by employing two notions of good?
Ultimately though, we need to complicate the above argument for Kierkegaard even in light of this information. Kierkegaard was using premises his opponents accepted. That includes a unified notion of good. But it may soften some of the worry we had about the conclusion. There may be ethical good, and this is what we can come to by reason alone. Then there might be religious good, which is provided by divine insight. When they are in conflict, the divine trumps the rational. But still – Kierkegaard’s opponents might say - we may make headway in understanding what's ethical by using rationality. We just can't assume that we've figured it all out. We need God for that. So, we still have some link to what's ethical, namely what we can uncover with rationality, but we just must remain open to the ethical being trumped sometimes as a matter of faith.
Objections and Exercises
Objection #1:
(1) The Knight of Faith cannot explain certain harmful choices to anyone
(2) For any agents S, S’, and choice C, if S cannot explain C to S’, then S cannot justify C to S’
(3) Hence, Knight of Faith cannot justify certain harmful choices to S’
(4) If agent S is a member of the moral community, then S must be able to justify harmful choices to other agents in that community
(5) Hence, the Knight of Faith is not a member of the moral community
The absurd cannot be explained to those who haven’t experienced it. Consider some analogies. There’s a difference between respecting Shakespeare by reading his work and learning others respect him, versus studying the bard intensely and respecting him through that study. Imagine trying to explain to someone who didn’t have that deep appreciation of Shakespeare, why you respect him after your intense study. Similarly, there’s a difference between, say, reading and memorizing love poetry, and actually feeling love. Imagine explaining to someone versed in love who has never experienced it, why you love someone. In both cases, it seems you need direct experience to understand the phenomenon on that level. What applies in these cases seems to apply to Abraham and the absurd. Abraham is presumably not going to be able to explain himself to others, i.e. why he intends to sacrifice Isaac. This is support for (1).
Moreover, it seems (2) is true, since plausibly justifying some choice to someone seems to require being able to explain yourself to them. (3) follows by logic from (1) and (2). And it seems plausible with respect to (4) that being a member of the moral community, that is, an agent who has dignity, deserves respect, is autonomous over their actions, and intends to live in a community alongside others of this sort, requires an ability to justify choices harmful to your fellow community members. (5) follows from the preceding by logic, concluding faith of the sort Kierkegaard has in mind seems to exclude one from the moral community thus understood.
Exercise #1:
Is this sound? If so, all the premises are true. If not, one must be false. I think the weakest is (4). This is partly because it’s ambiguous. Consider to ways to read the premise, based on how we understand the scope of the word “must”:
(4*) MUST [If agent S is a member of the moral community, then S is able to justify harmful choices to other agents in that community]
(4**) If agent S is a member of the moral community, then MUST [S is able to justify harmful choices to other agents in that community]
See if you understand why these are different. As guidance, first assume (4*) is true, and see if that means (4**) is also true, or whether (4**) might be false. Then, assume (4**) is true, and check whether that means (4*) must thereby be true or false. If one of the readings can be true while the other false, then the meanings of the expressions differ.
Once you’ve done this, see whether the argument remains valid if you replace (4) with (4*) in the original argument, or (4**) in the original argument. Remember, an argument is valid just in case if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true. Check if it’s sound as well with such replacements.
Objection #2:
(1) On Kierkegaard’s reading of the Binding of Isaac, God is either not all-knowing or not all-good
(2) God is both all-knowing and all-good
(3) Hence, Kierkegaard’s reading is false
This is too quick; I think Kierkegaard has a response. He believes humans are fallen, sinful, limited, and fallible. Moreover, this is a show not tell God. God could've told Abraham the truth about the exercise, but took this as a teachable moment to show Abraham how much faith he has in God, by forcing him to conflict God's command and the ethical. God knows telling fallen things only goes so far, but showing has them feel the force of his word.
This response, however, puts Kierkegaard in another bind. Consider:
(1) SUPPOSE: Through God all things are possible
(2) If (1), then God could explain Abraham’s faith to Abraham without the test
(3) Hence, God could explain Abraham’s faith to Abraham without the test
If Kierkegaard’s response to the first argument is correct, then we’re still left without an explanation for why this show rather than tell all-powerful God tested Abraham when he didn’t have to.
Exercise #2:
There seems to be a conflict here between God understood by Kierkegaard as being all-powerful, and God as being all-good. Re-examine the expanded Euthyphro dilemma above and explain how Kierkegaard might respond to this objection.