Speak No Evil: Explicating Hermeneutical (In)justice I defend necessary and sufficient conditions for what I take to be the best candidate interpretation of Hermeneutical Injustice - prejudicial gaps in collective hermeneutical resources resulting in members of marginalized groups being unable to understand certain harmful experiences - based on Miranda Fricker's various writings on the topic. I show how this definition avoids real and potential verbal disputes in recent relevant literature. Additionally, I explicate the proposed remedy of Hermeneutical Injustice, namely, Hermeneutical Justice as cultivation of virtuous conversational skills directed towards charitable understanding of marginalized speakers, having both epistemic and moral aspects. I argue these aspects of Hermeneutical Justice are independently motivated context-sensitive standing responsibilities we all share and - building on previous work - observe one consequence of understanding Hermeneutical Justice in this manner is that certain agents may bear substantial responsibilities in contexts exhibiting Hermeneutical Injustice. Lastly, noting Fricker might balk at such a consequence since Hermeneutical Injustice is a structural injustice often lacking perpetrators, I show there is conceptual space in Fricker’s account for responsibility I claim should constitute Hermeneutical Justice, suggest the proposed context-sensitive principles may provide responses to critics who question the efficacy of Fricker’s characterization of Hermeneutical Justice, and illustrate how these principles provide clear mechanisms for analyzing responsibility in a range of practical - and important - cases. Given the explanatory benefits, accuracy of applications, etc., I conclude Fricker has overwhelming reasons to adopt the explication of Hermeneutical Justice offered here.