My task in this discussion is to make clear an aspect of existentialism that will motivate much of our discussion to follow, namely, the claim that there are  no objective grounds or justification for values. This might strike you as odd. Consider that the following seems true:

(T) It is wrong to torture infants solely for fun

Note, the claim in (T) concerns torturing infants solely for fun. This claim is silent over - contentious - cases where, say, such torture would be for some greater purpose. Put such cases aside. Note too, (T) is not saying said torture would be for no reason whatsoever. It's not obviously true that humans can act for no reason, so such a claim might be a non-starter. No, this claim seems defensible as it stands, i.e. (T) seems clearly true. If you doubt it, reflect for a moment. Don't you agree?

Suppose you do. Why is (T) true?

You might think it's simply obvious. But that seems an odd sort of justification. Many things that seem obviously true are in fact not. Tables seem obviously composed largely of matter, but they're largely empty space. Intuitions are notoriously susceptible to counter-evidence.

In any event, what seems obvious to you may not seem so obvious to others. Ted Bundy - the well-known serial killer - once claimed to know the difference between "right" and "wrong". He said "It's wrong to jaywalk, wrong to murder, wrong to not pay your taxes,…" Note what he's done here is lump together murder and jaywalking, among other things. He seems to not even understand the distinction between legal wrong or social wrong and moral wrong. What justification might we give him? "It seems to me obvious you're wrong, Ted" seems unhelpful. He may just as well say the same to you.

Of course, there are more of us than him, so maybe it's in his interest to play the clever knave and not murder, etc. Surely he values his own interest. Surely we might provide him that sort of justification, namely, "(T) is true because if you don't believe it we'll incarcerate you" or something like that. This amounts to morality by vote. That might work here, but it doesn't always. The slave trade was motivated by a majority who thought it permissible. That doesn't mean it was. This, moreover, applies to variations on the same theme: appeals to legal codes, cultures, family norms, etc.

Perhaps appealing to religion or some Godhead will help? Many existentialists reject such appeals, finding them just as unhelpful. We won't spend time discussing why here, but suffice it to say - for my part - I find the evidential problem of evil to provide sufficient evidence to dispute the existence of traditional Godheads.

Perhaps an appeal to human nature? This might amount to the claim that humans have a natural disposition not to torture infants for fun and so we shouldn’t. This is fallacious reasoning. Consider:

(1) If x's natural disposition is P then P is what x should do
(2) Humans have a natural disposition not to torture infants for fun
(3) Hence, humans should not torture infants for fun

The first premise encodes the Naturalistic Fallacy, that is, claiming the way something is, is the way things should be. There are many reasons to doubt this as a general rule. Humans are - arguably - naturally disposed to egoism, but it doesn't follow we should be egoistic. This - and many other examples - are reasons to think there's no royal road from dispositions and nature to morality.

It gets worse…There's also reason to think it wouldn't matter if there was such a road. The following argument cuts at the heart of the claim that there are objective moral values. Presumably, one major reason for thinking there are such things is to adjudicate disputes between those disagreeing over moral matters. Put another way, if there were such objective moral values, we'd have good grounds for saying Ted was wrong. We'd have a standard against which to assess him for failure.

Consider, however, the following Debunking Argument that suggests even if there were such objective moral values, they wouldn't be able to help us in this respect anyway:

(1) SUPPOSE: Natural selection theory is true
(2) If (1), then our evaluative (moral) attitudes have been shaped by natural selection
(3) Hence, our moral attitudes have been shaped by natural selection (from 1 and 2 by modus ponens)
(4) SUPPOSE: There are objective moral truths
(5) If (3) and (4), then there either is or isn't a relationship between our moral attitudes and objective moral truths
(6) Hence, there either is or isn't a relationship between our moral attitudes and objective moral truths (from 3, 4, and 5 by modus ponens)
(7) SUPPOSE: There is no relationship between our moral attitudes and objective moral truths
(8) If (7), then there is no reason to believe what we think are moral truths align with objective morality
(9) Hence, there is no reason to believe what we think are moral truths align with objective morality (from 7 and 8 by modus ponens)
(10) SUPPOSE: There is a relationship between our moral attitudes and objective moral truths
(11) If (10), then the best explanation for this relationship is that moral attitudes enhance fitness rather than track truth
(12) Hence, the best explanation for this relationship is that moral attitudes enhance fitness rather than track truth (from 10 and 11 by modus ponens)
(13) If (12), then we've no reason to believe what we think are moral truths aligns with objective morality
(14) Hence, we've no reason to believe what we think are moral truths aligns with objective morality (from 12 and 13 by modus ponens)
(15) Hence, if (4) then we've no reason to believe what we think are moral truths aligns with objective morality (from 4, 7-9, and 10-14 by disjunction elimination)

In other words, supposing natural selection theory is true, we're shaped by them and they're fitness-enhancing rather than truth-tracking. So, if there are objective moral truths, there's little reason to think we can track those truths, rather than track whatever enhances fitness. Moreover, there's little reason to think fitness aligns with truth. The reasoning to (15), note, follows from assuming there are moral truths. On that assumption, either our attitudes have some relation to them or not. Either way, (15) follows. The argument is valid, and there seem good reasons to think it might be sound too. Hopefully now, you see some motivation for skepticism about moral value. This is quite the worry…

Existentialists didn’t really give arguments like the one above for such claims. Even so, the preceding is a good reason to think they're right. But it gets worse. Existentialists were skeptical about objectivity all value. It applies just as well to logic. Consider an argument from Lewis Carrol, in his article What the Tortoise Said to Achilles:

Suppose you have an argument of the form:

(1) If P then Q
(2) P
(3) Hence, Q (from 1 and 2 by modus ponens)

Surely this seems valid, insofar as accepting (1) and (2) seems to commit you to (3). Rejecting (3) on those assumptions seems irrational. But consider this is all background assumption for the reasoning to go through. If we're explicit, then we should put it into the argument itself, as follows:

(1) If P then Q
(2) P
(3) If you have "If P then Q" and "P" then "Q" follows
(4) Hence, Q (from 1, 2, and 3 by modus ponens)

This seems valid, but note the initial request for justification in moving from lines (1) and (2) can be repeated for lines (1), (2), and (3). Indeed, it seems this request can be continued…forever…in other words, there is a regress.

This suggests that even in the case of logic, our justification for our rules, norms, values, etc., is ultimately ungrounded. This is a much more worrisome plight, I think, than the suggestion about moral values above. The Debunking Argument suggests moral values wouldn't be useful to us even if they existed, which is worrisome in part because we seem to lack grounds on which to justify our knowledge of such values; the above regress argument suggests there is no way to justify our logical values, even if they are useful to us.

To be fair, there are several responses one might make to each of these arguments (see my blog post “Trust Logic, Not Tortoises” for discussion of the the latter regress). Our purposes here is not to adjudicate, but rather to help you understand why some believe there is no ultimate justification for values in the world. It takes a non-negligible amount of work to mount a response to these worries, and it's contentious whether any responses are sufficient.

Do you feel existential dread yet? No? Don't worry, it gets even worse…

Put logic aside for a moment, and focus on the claim that there are no objective moral values. Suppose you believe that's true. Here's one thing I want to be able to say, and I mean I want to be able to say this literally:

(R) Our culture is better for no longer engaging in the slave trade

Presumably, you agree with this. It seems literally true to me that we've made progress in this way, i.e. we're better for no longer selling people as property. But here's the rub. If there are no objective moral values, how can I say that strictly speaking? To say we're "better" is to suppose some standard of moral evaluation. We've assumed there is no objective standard of moral evaluation. But many slave traders explicitly believed what they were doing was morally permissible, and so they wouldn't obviously think that we're better than they were. At best, our beliefs are just different rather than better. But if this is true, then we can't speak of moral progress even within a culture. That is, we can't literally say (R).

This generalizes across groups as you might expect, and is of the moment for our readings. Consider, the famous existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre wrote several important works as part of a resistance movement in a France occupied by the Nazis. Now, if there is such a thing as a just war, I think one of the best candidates for such a thing would be World War II. In fact, I believe it's true to say allied forces were right to fight the axis powers, because the axis powers were engaged in morally reprehensible behaviors. Presumably, Sartre believed this as well. But again here's the rub. If there are no objective moral values, then how can we say the Nazis were morally wrong, rather than they simply had a different set of beliefs that conflicted with ours? To be sure, they did have a different set of beliefs that conflicted with many of ours. The worry here is that's just not enough to capture the phenomenon. It seems clear the Nazis were wrong, and we were just in stopping them.

We'll see what sort of resources existentialists have to get out of this dilemma as we progress in the course. The upshot to take away here is that though the existentialists we're reading don't give arguments for thinking there are no ungrounded objective values, there are reasons to think there aren't in logic and even if there were in morality it wouldn't help us. Absent such values, however, it seems we can't make moral progress and can't justify, say, what appears to have been a just war against Nazi aggression. We'll see what Sartre has to say about some of this next week, in his Existentialism is a Humanism.